Greek Election Opinion Polls

Here is an attempt to collect and digitise all the opinion poll results, as presented in national media, for the forthcoming election on September 20th 2015.

42 Academics on whether Greece should default

Chicago Booth's IGM Forum asked 42 academic experts whether Greece would be better off defaulting on its debt.

On the streets of Athens with Golden Dawn - a documentary by Kostas Georgousis

 

A documentary by Kostas Georgousis regarding the contemporary threat of neonazism in Greece.




The best coverage of the Greek crisis I have seen so far

Recently I viewed a one hour documentary byBB3 regarding the Greek economic crisis and its effect on various social and economic groups. I believe it is trully worth watching and I would like to share it.

Stable Link for "Coming Here Soon: Greece, Bust, and Broken" - http://www.bbc.co.uk/i/b01kbz15/

 

For NON-UK residents the documentary is available in 4 parts via youtube:

Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4

What is the effect of austerity policies on Greek universities?

A very interesting and detailed read posted on the education activist network by the Professor of Physics and Epistemology at the University of Athens, Kostas Skordoulis.

Greek Election Outcomes

http://soberlook.com/2012/06/greek-elections-decision-tree.html

Syriza is to blame

A quick article about the propaganda and catastrophic rhetoric that has been developed by Greek media against Syriza. By TeacherDude

Greece's exit may become the euro's envy

A really interesting article by Arvind Subramanian published in Financial Time: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4bdda8a0-9dad-11e1-9a9e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1uw62w3tz

Here is why Greece won't exit the Euro

The link is from the Efxnews.com

A technical post on how to get access to the raw data of a Flash site

Having recalled the misery that prevailed my brain when the Hellenic Parliament published the financial audit for all the elected MPs and MEPs back in December 2011 (update: the data is not up anymore. The webpage containing the files and allowing public access remained online for almost two months and then it was taken down) and which on purpose? selected the non-useful Flash file type to present the data, I fell today on the post that I reproduce below. The source i retrieved it from is DataDrivenJournalism.net (an exceptional and really informative site when it comes to data processing and presenting techniques) but Originally published by Dan Nguyen on ProPublica on 30 December 2010 under a Creative Commons license.  

The most realistic predictions on what follows in the Greek debt story

I reproduce from Economistmeg.com an article written by Megan Greene on what follows in the story of the Greek debt crisis.

German proposal for Greece’s compliance: accelerating eurozone exit

JANUARY 28, 2012

At the top of my list of to do’s for the past few weeks has been to update the post on Greek PSI that I wrote just before Christmas to include some more recent developments, such as the prospect of ECB participation. Last night, Peter Spiegel from the Financial Times (@SpiegelPeter) published the German government’s proposalfor Greece’s “improvement of compliance” with the terms of the bailout, and all of a sudden Greek PSI positively pales in comparison. According to Germany’s proposal, whatever the result of the PSI deal, Greece will need to “legally commit itself to giving absolute priority to future debt service” and “accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level”. If the Greek government is not willing to do this, the troika would presumably turn off the taps of bailout money and Greece would default. With no access to market or official financing, Greece would be forced to exit the eurozone.

Το κόστος της Δημοκρατίας

Αναδημοσιεύω από το madata.gr

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Ο Σύλλογος ΕΛΛΗΝΕΣ ΦΟΡΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΙ, κατά το διάστημα του Δεκεμβρίου 2011 και του Ιανουαρίου 2012, πραγματοποίησε μιν ειδική μελέτη, η οποία βασίστηκε στην ανάλυση της νομοθεσίας κάθε χώρας, αλλά και στις αξιολογήσεις κάθε χώρας από τα όργανα του Συμβουλίου της Ευρώπης, και εξετάζει τα συστήματα και τις πρακτικές χρηματοδότησης των πολιτικών κομμάτων στις χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

Τη μελέτη αυτή, την εξέδωσε σήμερα σε μορφή βιβλίου, με τίτλο:
ΤΟ ΚΟΣΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ - Μέρος 1ο: Η Χρηματοδότηση των Πολιτικών Κομμάτων.

Ένα (πολύ) μικρό ιστορικό παράδειγμα προς αποφυγή

Ιστορικός δεν είμαι. Απλά λατρεύω την μοντέρνα ιστορία. Συχνά πυκνά ανατρέχω σε κεφάλαια βιβλίων που έχω διαβάσει παλιότερα για να διατηρώ τη μνήμη μου και την ιστορική μου επιχειρηματολογία σε ικανοποιητικά επίπεδα. Έτσι λοιπόν έκανα και σήμερα...

μ'ένα από τα αγαπημένα μου βιβλία (ιστορίας και μη) του Βασίλη Ραφαηλίδη, "Η κωμικοτραγική ιστορία του Νεοελληνικού Κράτους" εκδ. Εικοστού Πρώτου.(1)

Πέφτω πάνω στα κεφάλαια που αφιερώνονται στον Ελληνικό εμφύλιο και τα γεγονότα που τον περιβάλουν. Χαρακτηριστικά διαβάζω:

Why the Greek rescue plan is condemned to a failure

Given the opportunity derived from the article posted by Mr. Provopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece to Financial Times this evening, i had the wish to reply.

My prediction is that the near future will reveal that the  views expressed by the governor of the Bank of Greece are unrealistic. Primarily for two simple reasons that are not at all discussed by Mr. Provopoulos.

First, the Government that is implementing the reforms, for a respectable proportion of the Greek public, is perceived as non-legitimate, non-democratically elected and thus non-socially acceptable. Although they have an enormous parliamentarian majority, the ability to make an effective policy change and reform the economy primarily depends upon the perception of how legitimacy the government is. In the Greek current case perhaps the government lacks of that dynamic. Hence, any policy change that is proposed and enacted will fall into the umbrella of the authoritarian decision-making hence will gradually increase the existing tension which will in the end lead to social unrest (at a level that the past will seem idealistic and peaceful compared to what will occur)

Second reason why the government's attempt to reform and restructure the economy is condemned to a massive failure concerns the issue of the disbelief and uncertainty derived from both domestic entities and foreign institutions and officials on whether the Greek economy can be viable by remaining in the Eurozone. Foreign agents ranging from public officials in the EU, IMF and ECB tend to offer opinions and statements that contradict, thus leading to an increase of the economic uncertainty. That disbelief of the success of the Austerity programme that is currently applied together with alternative scenarios that indicate Greece will not remain in the euro for very long destroy any positive attempt (if such exists) towards the increase of investments and expansion of the economic participation of the private sector. Assuming that today a private agent in Greece or abroad is interested in investing in a project and possesses the required capital to do so, the climate of uncertainty for the currency drives her to a delay and continuous postponement of the investing process. This delay is extremely rational given the enormous devaluation that will occur to a hypothesized new currency. An investor who decides to invest today in that unstable Greek environment is willing to take massive risks due to the immediate losses that will incur from a change in the currency and the devaluation that will follow as a consequence. Thus the potential investor chooses rationally to delay until the environment settles (and there is a political and economic guarantee what the currency will be in the medium-run).

Due to these two reasons my projection and economic forecast differs completely from that of the Governor of the Bank of Greece. I tend to believe that the push for reform and economic restructure will continue to expand while the response on behalf of the society and the private agents will continue to be defensive and negative. As the indicators will be on deficit from the expected ones further pushing for reforms will be required, by a perceived as non-legitimate government which will lead gradually to the perception of an aggressive strategy by the government and the aggression at some point will destroy the remains of the social cohesion within the Greek public with severe and perhaps threatening consequences. The existing economic strategy is condemned to failure due to the public opposition.

Stable Link for the Original Article by Mr. Provopoulos: http://clippings.ft.com/listnavigator/mwgs/1781471

OECD Public Governance Review on Greece

The Greek PM most responsible for the debt? A graphic

Here is a very informative graphic depicting the Greek public debt against the time period of governance by each PM. Useful observations can be extracted.

 



 

Source: http://www.xrimanews.gr/agores/24608-poios-prwthypoyrgos-ths-xwras-dhmioyrghse-to-megalytero-xreos

 

Greek data in the year 2011 - When the opendata movement should laugh

On December 19th, 2011 the Greek Parliament and the "special committee for accountability" led by Mr. Evaggelos Argiris, uploaded the ownership reports of all the MPs and MEPs for the year 2009 (economic year 2010). Despite the time lag and the delay in the name of accountability and transparency the official site of the Greek Parliament accommodated for the first time in Greek history data that according to the voted plan could raise awareness on the financial status of the elected public figures, thus allowing civic control and accountability. The plan for publishing the data and making it publicly accessible was massively advertised as a way to enter the digital era of data with useful benefits for the society derived from the ability to hold the politicians accountable. However, the original plan is completely different from the mere reality.

Initially it is quiet interesting to note that the cost for developing and maintaining the Parliament's site according to the President's statement is a total of 1,059,516.27 Euro (proof 1, proof 2). A rational mind should expect that a site that has cost to the Greek tax payer a  respectable amount of money will be suitable to store a good sort of information while serving hundreds of users at the same time. This working hypothesis based upon the rationality that such an expensive site will be able to provide quality services to the users, seems to have been falsified.

When the ownership reports of the MPs and MEPs were uploaded the site went offline for most of the morning hours and was unable to serve the demand of many users who desired to hold access to the fresh information. (I managed to finally access the website at around 14.00 having refreshed it a hundred of times)

On top of the inability to respond to high demand adequately, the second surprise and disappointment that led to anger was caused by the format that the site engineers (?) chose for the information to be stored. Paradoxically all the reports were in Flash format. According to people who are aware of the internet customs, this is quiet unusual as today most of the textual information takes the form of html or at worst embedded pdf, types that are accessible by a wider audience and allow users to process the data more easily. (source) In contrast, the engineers of the site chose to provide the information in Flash that is actually a digital depiction of the printed document. This type is nonmanagable by spreadsheet or other data processing softwares.

Data analysts, citizens, journalists, academics will be unable to download the information, store it and potentially analyse it in order to produce useful results such as comparisons, trends etc.

Was the selection of the specific format just a random choice?

An answer to the intention (or randomness) can be given directly by the terms of use that anyone can view from the same page as the reports of the ownership statuses. I quote the translation of Paragraph No. 5:

"It is forbidden to copy, publish, or partially publish the electronic ownership reports. Access to the data is only allowed through the portal of the Hellenic Parliament and only by technical tools that have been used for that purpose"

I guess that most of the questions regarding whether the selection of the format was intentional or not can be answered by the legal framework that was set to cover the information. It is clear that the status quo desires the data of their ownership statuses to be fully protected and hence citizens to only get a limited and thus non-threatening taste of civic control and accountability. They have forbidden through the terms of use any partial reproduction, copying of the data so as in two, three years from now when the fresher data for the present year become available, citizens to be fully unable to compare and run statistical analyses on the changes and trends of the elected officials' ownership statuses.

Other Observations:

A) The stable link for the reports of ownership of the MPs and MEPs for the year 2010: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Organosi-kai-Leitourgia/epiropi-elegxou-ton-oikonomikon-ton-komaton-kai-ton-vouleftwn/Diloseis-Periousiakis-Katastasis-Oikonomikou-Etous-2010-Chrisi-2009/

B) The reports and the terms of use are not accessible in English or any other language. Hence only Greek speakers can read and check the data. (I remind you here the cost of the site).

C) Downloading and analysing the data is illegitimate according to the terms of use. However if you seek a practical resolution to the problem imposed by the Flash format you may read here.

D) An interesting comment (by Takis Bouyouris) I read about the format of the information and the limited web accessibility that constitutes a violation of European Legislation. (e.g people with limited visibility are unable to use the special softwares that read machine language and convert it into audible sound).

Further Reading:

Exceptional opinions on  the ownership reports that I have read (unfortunately only in Greek)

- Zaphod Galaxyarchis

- Georgakopoulos

- E-cannibals

Can't find data on private deposit outflows for the EU countries

Having examined the recent developments in the Eurozone, one of the main consequences of the euro crisis is the incline of outflow in private deposits as individuals perceive the economic climate quiet unattractive in certain areas. In addition countries suffering the immediate threat of a potential default face the  concern of a withdrawal from the Euro as the case for Greece that could cause a collapse or turbulence in the banking sector with unpredicted results which at the worst scenario can even mean a breakdown in financial institutions that will hence be unable to preserve the deposits of the individuals.

Given the above macroeconomic picture in the Euro area, households that foresee negative financial prospects attempt to protect the lifetime savings by either gambling in currency, i.e. exchanging their euro saving accounts into some different currency that they perceive as more stable, such as dollars, english pound, australian or Canadian dollars, etc. This option guarantees the protection of the deposits in the scenario that the country to which the bank account is held decides to exit the euro and devaluate a newly launched currency. However, the threat of this choice is that the banking institution of the domestic country that finds itself under a default regime, might end up bankrupt as well. Since the deposits are held at home (where home defaults and the financial institution faces bankruptcy) the owner might risk to lose all the deposits regardless of the currency that the account is in. As a result, gambling in currency while keeping the deposits at home should be selected if the individual foresees that the default and the devaluation of the new currency after the country exits euro will not harm the banking sector or threaten financial institutions with a potential collapse.

Alternatively, the second scenario a forward-looking depositor might select, is to send the deposits to a financial institution abroad, to a country that is more protected from the current euro financial crisis. In such case, even after a country in the Eurozone defaults, the deposits will not be threatened as the banking sector of the recipient country will be more secure.

I have analysed the two mechanisms of "rational" (?) investing thinking so as to explain two interesting measures that are derived from the concepts. These are the deposit outflows by country and the currency preference by country. The first involves the individuals who select to expatriate their money to a foreign financial institution. For academics and journalists it is extremely useful to measure the countries that the individuals choose to send funds to. The second, is a figure of "currency strength" in the minds of the individual depositors. Both may constitute an exceptional index of economic climate expressed by the confidence of the private account holders.

Unfortunately, although I thoroughly examined the sites of both Eurostat and European Central Bank for data related to the status and movement (flows) of private account holders by country, I was unable to retrieve anything useful or relevant. The problem is that this information should exist and financial institutions, policymakers and a few journalists are aware of. Does anyone have an idea how or where relevant information may be retrieved? I would appreciate any recommendations as i ended up desperate after searching in most relevant data portals. I am mainly interested in deposit outflows and currency conversions for countries at the core of the crisis which belong to the periphery of the EU such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 

Funnily enough, in various newspapers the reader will be able to find numerous articles containing information about private deposit outflows such as number of outflows in money and frequency, recipient countries etc. The articles i have read, unfortunately, don't reveal the sources of the data while some mention that are derived from confidential banking sources and analysts.

A good insight on the latest Greek socio-political developments

I copy the article which has been retrieved from Globalpost.com and conducted by Ken Maguire

I think that the article is extremely objective in terms of the facts provision. I would add that the main source of insecurity for the people is derived by the government itself (both the elected ex government of Pasok and the current transition government) which do not hold any social legitimacy at all among the majority of Greeks. 

 

Where Greeks hide their savings

With safes and Swiss accounts, rich Greeks could stand to profit from the crisis.

Demonstrators burn an EU flag during a protest in Thessaloniki on November 17, 2011 against austerity measures demanded by the new unity government to persuade its creditors to release bankruptcy-saving loans. Greeks are draining local banks in favor of Swiss accounts, London property and cash stashed in home safes. (Sakis Mitrolidis/AFP/Getty Images)

Is there a policy consensus among political scientists on anything?

This question is attempted to be answered by a promising initiative on global markets which launched few weeks ago by the Chicago Booth Business School.

Every week a panel of 40 carefully selected prominent academics and technocrats will be asked one policy question. The respondents will be able to signify their view by answering to the policy question by stating whether they "agree", "extremely agree", feel "uncertain", "disagree", or "extremely disagree" plus mentioning on a scale of 0 to 10 the confidence of their response.  The panel experts will also be able to offer a sort comment on the policy question so as to strengthen their response.

The initiative seems quite interesting although by some might be argued that policy questions and mechanisms demanding an agree/disagree type of answer might be oversimplistic and thus lead to non-useful observations.

The site with the panel policy surveys is accessible from here. Remember that one question will be raised per week thus is recommended to sign up for the automatic feed to receive the updates!